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Overview
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) around the 
world has increased remarkably since the late 
1990 s with both inward and outward invest-
ment dominated by the major industrialized coun-
tries. The yearly average from 1995 through 1999 
was 54. 15 billion dollars- 19 times as much as in 
the 1970 s. JETRO—the Japan External Trade 
Organization—in its 2001 report says that in 
1999, Britain ranked first in outward investment 
at 20. 21 billion dollars, followed by the United 
States , France , Germany, and the Netherlands. 
For inward investment, the U. S. has placed first 
for two straight years with 28.25 billion dol-
lars, followed by Britain, Sweden, Germany 
and France. 
  Cross-border mergers and acquisitions spark-
ed by globalization and the intensification of IT 
are two main reasons why the industrialized 
countries are the major investors. There is a 
widespread understanding in the industrial com-
munity that, in this swiftly changing business 
climate, M&A enables cross-border firms to ac-
quire production-line, technology and expertise, 
personnel, and marketing and distribution chan-
nels. This is regarded as an effective way to 
avoid running the risks of new investment and 
survive the fierce competition. 
JETRO' s 2001 report says that in 1999, reflect-
ing the spread of cross-border M&A, the EU's 
overseas investment in the United States in-
creased by 48.5 percent to 22.81 billion dollars 
compared to 1998, while its inward investment 
doubled to 23.79 billion dollars, excluding Greece. 
As a result, the EU'.s investment in the U. S to-
gether with internal investment among mem-
bers accounted for about a half of the world's 
total investment in 1999, showing how EU's 
very active EU investment has been across the 
globe. 
 Behind this EU trend, several factors can be 
identified. Firstly the launch of the single inte-
grated market in 1993 touched off cut-throat 
competition among regional business firms, lead-
ing to mergers, takeovers, and alliances. Sec-
ondly, the free flow of capital, services, informa-
tion and personnel in the course of globalization 
have naturally activated business consolidation 
outside the region too. Deregulation and privati-
zation policies could be counted as the third rea-
son. I also regard the introduction of the euro as 
another incentive for M&A as the euro has 
made it possible to issue EU-denominated 
bonds, thereby strengthening fund-raising abili-
ties. 
 We can see typical examples in the electron-
ics and telecommunications industry. British Vo-
dafone Group PLC took over AirTouch Commu-
nications of the U. S. in June 1999. Germany' s 
Mannesmann AG purchased British Orange 
PLC in 1999. This was followed by the purchase 
of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone AirTouch 
PLC. Change in cross-border consolidation among 
business enterprises is and will continue to be
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very intense as the wave of industrial restruc-
turing sweeps all regions of the world. 
FDI in and out of Japan 
 Now we turn our gaze to investment in and 
out of Japan. According to the JETRO report, 
Japan' s investment in the EU increased by 81. 
9 percent from the previous year to 25. 19 bil-
lion dollars in 1999. This was the largest over-
seas investment quantity from Japan, marking a 
two-digit increase for the third year in a row. 
By country, Britain came first and the Nether-
lands placed second, with Japan's investment in 
these two countries accounting for about 90 per-
cent of the total. 
 Regarding Britain, Japanese banks and secu-
rity houses accelerated their capital investment 
in financial institutions to improve and support 
their own deteriorating financial situation 
caused by the rise in Japan premiums. Some in-
crease in investment in the Netherlands stems 
from the growth of new holding companies 
aimed at making the most of the taxation bene-
fits. Holding companies are exempt from taxa-
tion when receiving profits, for example, and 
this leads to intensive business activity through 
those companies. 
 Inward investment in Japan hit an all-time 
high of 21.51 billion dollars, an increase of 105.5 
percent. Investment in manufacturing industry 
marked a sharprise of 257.8 percent from 1998 
to 8. 78 billion dollars in 1999. Investment in ma-
chinery formed an 88.3 percent share in this, 
particularly contributing to the increase. Of the 
investment in machinery, three-quarters came 
from European industry, among which the 
French automaker Renault SA's capital injec-
tion to the debt-laden Nissan Motor Company 
was a leading example. 
 Investment in non-manufacturing industry,
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too, rose by 58.5 percent to 12.72 billion dollars 
in 1999, with the financial and insurance sectors 
expanding for three years in a row. In the finan-
cial sector, the investment environment is chang-
ing rapidly and capital-related reorganization 
has been very active. 
 On the country basis, countries from the EU 
have emerged as new and major partners. 
France ranked first, replacing the U. S. – the 
largest investor since 1991 – for the first time. 
The Netherlands followed next though some big 
deals, such as GM Canada, are included in the 
statistics for the Netherlands, the JETRO report 
says. 
 As a whole, inward investment from the EU 
increased five-fold, by 505.8 percent to 12.32 
billion dollars. The EU's share in the total in-
vestment also climbed to 57.3 percent from 
19.4 percent in 1998. 
Renault's Capital Injection into Nissan 
 This growth of investment in Japan largely 
reflects large-scale M&A deals in the machin-
ery, financial and insurance sectors. In the ma-
chinery sector, the most notable inroads are 
seen in automobiles, where Renault SA struck a 
broad alliance with Nissan Motor. By providing 
capital of 54. 11 billion dollars, Renault acquired 
a 36. 8 percent equity stake in Nissan Motor and 
also a 22.5 percent equity stake in Nissan Die-
sel. In the financial and insurance industry, 
France' s life insurance firm Axa purchased Ni-
hon Dantai Life Insurance for 19.54 billion dol-
lars. 
 This large auto deal came when Nissan Mo-
tor, saddled with a huge sum of interest bear-
ing liabilities, opted for financial restructuring 
through a business tie -up with a global automaker. 
Financial support from a single main bank has 
become ever harder to obtain due to the bank's
 own  need  to  write  off  the  bad   loans  accumu-
lated  since  the  economic  bubble  burst.  On  the 
other hand, it was not unnatural for Renault to 
be looking for an influential partner to generate 
synergy gains through the pooling of the local 
production line, engineering and distribution 
channels. 
  Renault' s then Executive-Vice President, Car-
los Ghon, who took up the post of Chief Opera-
tion Officer, unveiled the revival plan in October 
1999. This aimed to streamline management by 
slashing the purchasing costs by 20 percent over 
the next two years. Mr. Ghon sold the majority 
stakes in the keiretsu business group, such as 
those in parts and components subsidiaries, and 
this forced the keiretsu's parts and components 
subsidiaries to seek consolidation. In April 
2000, a member of the Nissan parts and compo-
nents group, Ichimitsu Kogyou, received capital 
from a French components supplier, Valeo, and 
others also sought alliances with foreign capital. 
  Foreign components suppliers' alliances with 
or purchases of Japanese counterparts are said 
to be intended to beef up their own business ac-
tivities in Asia, with Japan at the core. At the 
same time, in a swiftly changing business cli-
mate, components makers and suppliers are un-
der pressure to develop the parts and compo-
nents which can keep up with the automakers' 
strategy in procurement and, the setting-up of 
global networks for parts and components sup-
ply. 
  It is, therefore, believed that many European 
components makers have a strategy of expand-
ing sales in Asia, taking advantage of transac-
tions with Japanese automakers. As Japanese 
components makers have established a foothold 
in Asia, the extensive use of Japanese produc-
tion-lines, and distribution networks, together 
with the joint development of products and en-
gineering, will help them to make inroads in
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 l ans  cumu- Asian markets. 
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French Industry' s Inroads in Japan 
 Here in brief, we review the history of French 
technology transfer to Japan. Japan's first silk 
mill was built in 1870 and first military plane in 
1919 with the aid of French technology. France 
was the first foreign country to transfer technol-
ogy to Japan after the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty was concluded in 1951. In 1953, the 
state-run Renault company gave permission to 
Hino Diesel to assemble 4 CV type Renault pas-
senger cars. 
France's investment in Japan grew remark-
ably in 1998, which also happened to be the cul-
tural `French Year in Japan'. Besides Renault's 
capital investment in Japan, the world' s second 
largest retailer, Carrefour, announced the open-
ing of large superstores in Japan in May 1999. 
A number of other French firms also announced 
their entry to Japan and opened branches or of-
fices in this country one after another. This 
was followed by the opening of the first store on 
the busy Ginza shopping street in Tokyo by 
France's largest cosmetics firm, Sephora. 
  This trend continued into 2000. The world's 
second largest tire maker, Michelin, announced 
a tie-up with Toyo Rubber Industry. Europe' s 
largest steel maker, Usinor, struck up an alli-
ance with Nippon Steel Corp. in January 2001. 
French industrial branches or offices in Japan 
numbered 450 as of October 2000. 
  An official responsible for economic and com-
mercial affairs at the French Embassy in Tokyo 
cited several attractions for French corporate 
investment in Japan, as follows : (1) —Fierce 
competition among business enterprises, result-
ing from the advance of globalization and infor-
mation technology, facilitates entry into big mar-
kets like Japan. (2) —The decline of real estate
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prices since the bursting of the bubble has 
made it easier for foreign investors to buy real 
estate. (3) —The advance into Japan was also 
prompted by deregulation and liberalization. (4) 
—The protracted economic slump has been driv -
ing Japanese firms to restructure and seek alli-
ances with foreign firms, in order to survive 
the cut-throat competition. The official also cited 
the long-established traditional cultures of France 
and Japan as an impetus for French firms to 
take an interest in the Japanese market, even 
though the details of Oriental culture differ from 
the culture of the West. 
 It goes without saying, however, that there 
have been several obstacles on the Japanese 
side, including high commodity prices, the diffi-
culty of finding business persons competent to 
conduct their duties in English, and the slow-
ness of internationalization of the business envi-
ronment. 
The EBU Calls for Easier Access to the 
Japanese Market 
 A JETRO survey conducted in October 2000 
reports that foreign investors have high regard 
for the improvements in the business environ-
ment in certain areas such as the decline in land 
prices, but notes that foreign investors still 
want further improvements. 71.4 percent of re-
spondents requested the compulsory disclosure 
of corporate information in accordance with in-
ternational accounting standards. 45.8 percent 
requested the introduction of a consolidated tax 
payment system as a necessary step for the 
globalization. About 70 percent of respondents 
also requested the launch of a system to provide 
the comprehensive information necessary to fa-
cilitate decisions on market entry. The single 
door inward investment organization of Britain 
is an example of what they want. 
 The European Business Community, corn-
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prised of foreign firms in Japan, issues an annual 
report as a paper for the EU-Japan Business 
Dialogue Roundtable—where issues arising be-
tween Japan and the EU are discussed. In its 
2000 report on 'Issues for the New Millennium' , 
the European Business Community applauded 
the Japanese government's embarkation on an 
ambitious program to lower regulatory barri-
ers, improve market access, strengthen compe-
tition and promote inward investment. It said 
that as a result, barriers to trade and invest-
ment are slowly falling, and opportunities in-
creasing for European companies in Japan. 
 The report further said, however, that filing 
and licensing requirements in such diverse sec-
tors as health sciences, cosmetics, telecom, civil 
aviation, and shipping not only present a major 
barrier to product innovation and service deliv-
ery, but also often fail in their original purpose 
of protecting consumers and society. 
 The report went on to say that the govern-
ment' s apparent commitment to bringing the 
Japanese tax regime in line with international 
practice was encouraging and welcome reduc-
tions in the overall effective corporate tax rate 
and the planned introduction of a system for 
taxing groups of companies. 
 Regarding the quest for easier access to the 
Japanese market, however, recommended that 
an appropriate land transaction disclosure mech-
anism should be introduced to make it easier for 
companies to acquire information and make in-
formed decisions on real estate transactions. 
The EBC urged the Japanese government to 
bring financial disclosure and accounting stand-
ards in line with international practice by re-
quiring adequate disclosure of current assets 
and liabilities at market-based prices. It stressed 
that access to accurate financial information re-
mained critical to firms wanting to pursue M&A.
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 Case Study I —Toyota's Plant in France 
Activates the Economy 
 As an example of the striking increase in 
automotive investment abroad in 1999, Toyota 
began building an auto-manufacturing plant and 
recruiting engineers, managers and maintenance 
teams in Valenciennes, northern France (near 
Brussels) . Toyota Tsusho also opened a distri-
bution base for auto parts and components 
there. I believe the French government's own 
call for Toyota to invest had some influence on 
Toyota's decision to locate its second plant in 
Europe. 
 Here, I shall look at how the location of this 
large-scale 4 billion franc (80 billion yen) auto 
assembly plant has been activating the local 
economy, including with regard to job creation. 
Toyota's new European plant began produc-
tion of the one-litre Yaris in January 2001. It em-
ploys 1, 600 local people as of January 2001 and 
this number will increase to 2, 100 when the pro-
duction capacity reaches 150, 000 units in mid-
2002. 
  Of 1, 600 line-operators, 43. 5 percent were 
job seekers, students or former national service 
personnel , 29 percent temporary , short-term 
contract workers and 27 .5 percent part-and 
full-time salaried workers. 80 percent of the total 
came from Nord prefecture, where Valencienne 
is located, 13 percent from Pas-de-Calais region, 
and the remaining 7 percent from other areas. 
  Toyota says that since its launch of the 
Toyota Valencienne-Onnaing project at the end 
of 1997, the project has generated business op-
portunities for numerous firms in the region. 
More than 300 companies in the region have 
benefited. 283 companies were involved in build-
ing the factory and installing the manufacturing 
equipment. 223 of these were French. 511 com-
panies have provided Toyota Motor Manufac-
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turing France with goods and services. 120 
European car parts suppliers, of which 37 per-
cent are French, have provided parts and com-
ponents. 
 Environmental conservation is another fea-
ture of the Toyota plant in France. 26 hectares 
of the total 200 hectare site is planted with over 
22, 000 plants of different species as a Regional 
Nature Park. Flower meadows cover 80 hectares 
and there is also a 51 hectare mowed meadow. 
 Buildings are constructed in a discreet, low-rise 
manner. The best suited materials have been se-
lected to minimize waste at source, as an envi-
ronmentally-friendly waste disposal manage-
ment measure. Waste is separated in order to 
achieve the maximum re-use of plastic parts 
and packaging and recycling of paper, wood and 
metal. 
 Parts imported from Japan are transported 
by waterways from Dunkirk to a nearby loca-
tion. The Yaris cars produced there are ex-
ported by railway. Toyota says this eco-friendly 
production system is consistent with the Toyota 
production corporate principle of throughly 
eliminating waste on production sites. 
The First Plant in Europe Built in England 
  Toyota plant in Valencienne was its second 
vehicle production unit in Europe. The first pro-
duction plant was built in Burnaston, Derby-
shire, England in 1989. Toyota's inroads into 
Britain were prompted by British enthusiasm to 
invite foreign capital to revitalize regional 
economies. The British government had long 
been promoting deregulation and liberalization, 
and Thatcherism intensified the effort to attract 
foreign firms by enhancing the incentives to in-
vest, including through reductions in corporate 
tax and the provision of a highly skilled 
work-force.
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 Britain had experienced serious unemploy-
ment when the key industries of coal and ship-
building declined, and tried hard to invite in-
ward investment in order to create jobs. Seek-
ing to attract foreign capital, it established a 
single door inward investment organization 
which funnels the necessary information and fa-
cilitates decision-making on whether to enter 
the market. In Britain, where authority is de-
centralized, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire-
land each has its own single door office to invite 
foreign capital in cooperation with the central 
government. 
 I would like to relate the example of a visit I 
made in 1998 to the industrial zone of Silicon 
Glen in Scotland-a 160 kilometer electronics and 
biotechnology corridor extending from Glasgow 
to Edinburgh. Looking around at the concentra-
tion of the semiconductor industry, I could find 
affordable land, water, utilities, and a skilled 
labor force all at a relatively low cost, and a low 
corporate tax rate. They are good incentives 
for attracting foreign capital. JETRO says, how-
ever, the strong pound and week euro have ad-
versely affected corporate profits, forcing some 
businesses to shift some manufacturing units to 
Central and Eastern Europe or even leave Brit-
ain entirely. It is likely that the British domina-
tion of FDI will be undermined by that fact of 
remaining outside the euro zone. The issue of 
whether Britain joins the euro or not may have 
a substantial effect on inward investment in 
Britain in the future.
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Case Study II —Sony Europe 
 Here I would also like to introduce how one of 
Japan's global companies has developed its busi-
ness strategy in the cross-border market. Sony 
Europe GmbH, which holds 15 manufacturing 
and engineering units on the Eurasian conti-
nent, moved its headquarters from Cologne to 
Berlin in October 1999. In the Federal Republic 
of Germany, states have decisive authority in ar-
eas other than diplomacy, defense and other fed-
eral matters. The state of Nordrhein-Westfalen 
in the midwest with Dusseldorf as its capital, 
has about 550 Japanese business branches, offices 
and factories. In this state, the banks file for in-
vestment on behalf of foreign companies and 
this is widely known as a measure that pro-
motes inward investment. 
 Sony Europe's head office is said to have se-
lected Berlin as the site for its headquarters in 
Europe for the following three reasons. (1) —Ger-
many is the largest sales market for Sony in 
Europe. (2)—Berlin's social and information in-
frastructure is sufficient to support a headquar-
ters at a time when Germany's political and 
economic role is growing, especially in view of 
the EU's enlargement towards Central and 
Eastern European countries. (3) —Berlin is cen-
trally situated between Western Europe, with 
its population of 380 million people, and Central 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, with 
their population of about 400 million people. This 
location is considered favorable for promoting 
Sony's growth and strategic competitiveness. 
 In terms of corporate advantages from the 
standpoint of business activities in Europe, Sony 
Europe GmbH is the center of an organically 
combined network of functions, such as engi-
neering, manufacturing, marketing and distribu-
tion and other services dispersed in various re-
gions. Sony says that instead of excessive con-
centration of business activities in certain areas, 
dispersion of those activities is necessary to 
meet the challenges of cross-border transac-
tions. The marketing functions of electronics 
products for daily use are set up near to the 
Netherlands' Schiphol airport–a hub airport of 
Europe. London is chosen as the center of fi-
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nancial services and entertainment goods, such 
as PlayStation and AIBO. The possible future 
shift of manufacturing units to Central and East- 
ern Europe and also the potential growth of 
these former communist states may be counted 
as another business advantages of Berlin. 
 Sony believes that the countries of the former 
East Europe will develop into attractive mar- 
kets with promising economic growth. It also 
evaluates this region highlyas a treasury of 
highly educated manpower resources. Thus,
